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Abstract: We consider approaches to explanation within the cognitive sciences that begin with 
Marr’s computational level (e.g., purely Bayesian accounts of cognitive phenomena) or Marr’s 
implementational level (e.g., reductionist accounts of cognitive phenomena based only on neural 
level evidence) and argue that each is subject to fundamental limitations which impair their ability 
to provide adequate explanations of cognitive phenomena. For this reason, it is argued, explanation 
cannot proceed at either level without tight coupling to the algorithmic and representation level. 
Even at this level, however, we argue that additional constraints relating to the decomposition of 
the cognitive system into a set of interacting subfunctions (i.e., a cognitive architecture) are 
required. Integrated cognitive architectures that permit abstract specification of the functions of 
components and that make contact with the neural level provide a powerful bridge for linking the 
algorithmic and representational level to both the computational level and the implementational 
level. 
Keywords: Cognitive Architecture; Explanation; Algorithmic and Representational Level; Bayes’ 
Rule; Cognitive Neuroscience 
Explanation within cognitive science has frequently been argued to require multiple domains or levels, 
and several distinct multi-level accounts of cognitive scientific explanation have been proposed (e.g., 
Chomsky, 1965; Cummins, 1983; Marr, 1982; Newell, 1982). The account of Marr, however, has 
received perhaps the most attention. A central tenet of Marr’s analysis is that a complete explanation 
of a device’s behaviour requires an account of that behaviour at what he terms the Computational 
Level (CL), the Algorithmic and Representational level (ARL), and the Implementation Level (IL). 
While Marr argued that an account at each of the three levels was required for a complete explanation, 
he also emphasised the primacy of the most abstract of his levels, the Computational Level. 
Specifically, he argued that while “algorithms and mechanisms are empirically more accessible, […] 
the level of computational theory […] is critically important from an information-processing point of 
view [… because …] the nature of the computations that underlie perception [and, by extension, 
cognition] depends more upon the computational problems that have to be solved than upon the 
particular hardware in which their solutions are implemented” (Marr, 1982, p. 27). This position has 
face validity, particularly with respect to naturally intelligent systems where the particular hardware in 
which the solutions are implemented is shaped by evolutionary factors, and so will arguably be well-
suited, or perhaps even optimised, for the computational problems that an evolved agent such as 
ourselves must solve (though see Jacob, 1977). 
Marr was critical of approaches to the understanding of cognitive systems that were not rooted in the 
CL. For example, in discussing the work of Newell and Simon (1972) on the application of production 
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systems to problem-solving, he wrote that “mechanism-based approaches are genuinely dangerous. 
The problem is that the goal of such studies is mimicry rather than understanding, and these studies 
can easily degenerate into the writing of programs that do no more than mimic in an unenlightening 
way” (Marr, 1982, p. 347).1  
But is the primacy afforded by Marr to the CL justified? One could make plausible arguments for the 
primacy of Marr’s two other levels. Surely, for example, the Implementation Level provides a 
privileged starting point because we can directly study the operation and connectivity of neurons in 
different brain structures and regions – and in different species – and knowing how neurons function 
and interact can give us insights into the operation of small-scale neural networks which in turn can 
allow us to understand the capabilities of larger scale networks and structures. We will argue below 
that this purely reductionist strategy is likely to be of limited utility – in part because of the difficulties 
of “reverse inference” (inferring function from neural-level activation). Similarly, one might argue that 
a privileged role should be accorded to the Algorithmic and Representational Level, given the role that 
information processing models continue to play in the development of cognitive theory. This is the 
argument that we develop, though we do so in the context of cognitive architectures – theories of the 
organisation and interaction of the hypothesised subsystems subserving cognition.  
1. The Role of the Computational Level 
Part of Marr’s justification for CL explanation was a reaction against early AI computer programs that 
did not take seriously “the distinction between what a program did and how it did it” (Marr, 1982, p. 
28), thereby obscuring a mechanism’s purpose, but Marr was equally clear that a CL explanation 
should address two questions: “what a device does and why” (p. 22). The “what” question might be 
answered by a specific mathematical function (i.e., by set-theoretic descriptions of the inputs and 
outputs and a mapping from inputs to outputs), but to answer “why” questions requires additional 
machinery – typically appealing to over-arching background theories such as (in the case of the 
cognitive sciences) evolution. “Why” questions are undoubtedly critical for explanation, but, at least 
with respect to explanations of cognitive functioning, their potential answers are generally more 
speculative and far more difficult to address in concrete, unequivocal terms than “what” questions (see 
Anderson, this issue). A pragmatic approach is therefore to de-conflate “what” and “why” and 
approach them (where possible) as independent questions. 
Answering “what” questions requires a suitable language in which to phrase the answers. Over the last 
15 years CL theorising within the cognitive sciences has come to be dominated by approaches in 
which behaviour is understood in probabilistic terms, with appeal to Bayes’ theorem in order to 
determine the posterior probability of an event given evidence and prior probabilities (e.g., Griffiths, 
Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2008). Bayesian approaches have been particularly successful in providing 
putative accounts of behaviour that may be broadly characterised as inductive, such as categorisation 
(Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001) and reasoning (Oaksford & Chater, 2001), but it is important to 
recognise that there are alternative frameworks within which CL explanations might be developed. 
Marr (1982) used differential equations, but other feasible CL languages include formal logics (such 
as first-order predicate logic, various modal logics, defeasible logics – see Baggio, van Lambalgen & 
Hagoort, this volume – attribute-value logic, and combinatory logic), information theory (Shannon & 
                                                      
1 Certainly “explanation”, however defined, would seem to require more than mere mimicry, but equally to label 
Newell and Simon’s seminal work on problem-solving as “unenlightening” would seem churlish.  Marr’s 
criticism might be valid if Newell and Simon were just concerned with mimicry (i.e. data-fitting), but in 
accounting for human problem-solving behaviour Newell and Simon developed the Problem Space 
Computational Model (PSCM) – an account of the computational problem that problem-solving is required to 
solve. Thus, a key claim of the work of Newell and Simon was that problem-solving should be understood as the 
selection of a sequence of operators that would transform a given state into a goal state. While Newell and 
Simon may not have been explicit about it, this level of theorising frames the problem (of understanding human 
problem-solving) squarely at Marr’s CL. 
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Weaver, 1949), category theory (Phillips & Wilson, 2010), graph theory (Baronchelli et al., 2013) and 
even the problem-space theory of Newell and Simon (1972). From the perspective of Marr’s CL, 
Bayesian accounts do not have any a priori superiority over accounts expressed in any of these other 
frameworks.2 
The critical issue for cognitive science methodology is not so much the specific formalism in which 
CL theories should be stated, but what role (if any) CL statements should play in explaining cognition 
or developing cognitive theory. For Marr, the role of the CL was to formulate the computational 
problem under consideration precisely such that one might then consider how that problem might be 
addressed at the ARL. Critically, Marr was concerned not with the abstract computational problem 
faced by an agent (which with respect to vision might be expressed in Bayesian terms as being to 
determine the most likely interpretation of the current visual input), but with the computational 
problems faced by subcomponents (such as the retina, or the primary visual cortex) of that agent. 
Thus, Marr characterised the function of the retina as computing  and its time derivative of the 
retinal image (cf. Marr, 1982, p. 337). From this perspective the primary role of the CL is to constrain 
the ARL by specifying the overall function that must be computed at that level. 
2. Limitations of Purely Computational Level Explanations 
A critical feature of CL explanation is that it abstracts away from details of processing and 
implementation. To illustrate, consider the motivation given by Xu and Tenenbaum (2007) in 
developing their Bayesian account of word learning. The authors’ aim is “to understand in functional 
terms how implicit knowledge and inferential machinery guide people in generalising from examples 
– rather than to describe precisely the psychological processes involved” (p. 251). In other words, their 
aim is to present an account of their domain of interest (learning the meanings of words) that captures 
behavioural regularities while abstracting away from specific algorithmic and representational 
commitments. Similar appeals to the utility of CL explanation are common in the Bayesian literature 
(see, e.g., Norris, 2006). The emphasis is generally on how the CL account may serve as a highly 
abstract statement of theory that deliberately avoids lower-level commitments. This appeal to 
abstraction is also apparent in Marr’s original account of CL explanation. Specifically, his attack on 
the insufficiency of early AI programs as explanations included the complaint that “particular data 
structures, such as lists of attribute value pairs called property lists in the LISP programming language, 
were held to amount to theories of the representation of knowledge” (Marr, 1982, p. 28). By 
abstracting away from specific representational devices (such as LISP data structures), CL accounts 
side-step representational debates (including, for example, that underlying the connectionist / symbolic 
divide). 
In abstracting away from mechanism and process, CL explanations are generally held to be 
idealisations. Thus, processing constraints (e.g., working memory limitations) may mean that the 
actual function computed by a specific algorithm or implementation is only an approximation of the 
CL function. Again, Marr (1982) makes this point, citing Chomsky’s distinction between linguistic 
competence and linguistic performance within transformational grammar (Chomsky, 1965) as 
corresponding to the difference between a CL explanation and an ARL one, with performance factors 
modulating the competence theory. The same point has been made more recently with respect to 
Bayesian CL theories (e.g., Bowers & C. J. Davis, 2012; Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Rogers & 
Seidenberg, 2011). What does not appear to have been realised is the implications of this distinction 
between competence and performance for the evaluation of CL theories. Franks (1995) argued that, in 
                                                      
2 It is tempting to suggest that Bayesian accounts simultaneously address the “what” and the “why” question. If 
this were true it would enhance the plausibility of any Bayesian account. However, as Bowers and C. J. Davis 
(2012) argue, Bayesian accounts do not necessarily do this. Indeed, Bowers and Davis characterise many such 
accounts as “just-so” theories, a view consistent with that developed by Marcus and E. Davis (2013). 
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the absence of a performance theory, competence theories have limited predictive utility. More 
precisely, any competence theory prediction could be undermined by performance factors. 
Consequently competence theories (and hence CL explanations) are not falsifiable in the standard 
Popperian sense.  
Popperian falsifiability is not necessarily a requirement for scientific theorising (Lakatos, 1970), but 
the implications of the argument concerning performance factors are illustrated by the simulations of 
Cooper, Yule and Fox (2003), who compared the behaviour of three classes of model – Bayesian, 
associationist and hypothesis testing – with that of subjects on a sequential category learning task 
(medical diagnosis). During the task, subjects completed a series of trials where they were able to 
query the presence/absence of a virtual patient’s symptoms (e.g., headache, temperature, etc.) before 
making a diagnosis. Initially subjects were only able to guess, but feedback allowed them to learn the 
symptom/disease associations (which were probabilistic). Subjects were also encouraged to minimise 
the number of symptoms queried on each trial when making their diagnoses. Good performance on the 
task requires that for each virtual patient subjects query those symptoms that are most informative, 
adjusting the order of their queries on the fly based on the information they receive in response to their 
queries. The authors found that all three classes of model, when supplemented with appropriate 
performance factors, were able to replicate the key behavioural effects. Thus, for the Bayesian model 
it was necessary to assume that the initial probabilities (priors) of each symptom given each disease 
were less than 0.5 and that symptoms where queried based on an information-theoretic measure which 
embodied a confirmation bias. In contrast, the associationist model required strong negative initial 
associations between symptoms and diseases together with a form of recency bias implemented by 
adding low levels of noise to associations on each trial. For the hypothesis testing model subject 
performance was simulated by the use of a confirmatory strategy supplemented with moderate time-
based decay of the contents of working memory. In summary, while the performance factors differed 
across the classes of model, the net result was one of indistinguishability. The work is particularly 
apposite given that Xu and Tenenbaum (2007), in their study of word learning discussed in section 2, 
argue strongly for a Bayesian model and against associationist or hypothesis testing accounts of word 
learning. Cooper et al.’s result suggests that once performance factors are incorporated into each class 
of model, Xu and Tenenbaum’s argument does not hold: at the behavioural level a Bayesian model 
may be coerced into mimicking the performance of an associationist model by (e.g.) judicious choice 
of priors and the weighting of old and new evidence, just as an associationist model may be coerced 
into mimicking a Bayesian model by (e.g.) judicious choice of initial weights.  
A related limitation of CL accounts of behaviour is that they cannot make direct contact with one of 
the key traditional measures of the cognitive psychologists, namely response times. Given that CL 
accounts are concerned with what function is carried out by a system rather than how that function is 
computed, this may be justified, but it is a further barrier to relating CL accounts to behaviour. 
A focus on function is also more easily justified when an argument can be made that the processes 
under investigation can be decomposed into a linear chain of processing, as in Marr’s conception of 
vision whereby the input is represented and re-represented in a sequence of stages as it is transformed 
from a retinal map via first the primal sketch and then a 2½ dimensional viewer-centred sketch to a 3 
dimensional object-centred representation. A linear chain of this kind supports feedback between 
successive stages (and hence allows for necessary interactions between top-down and bottom-up 
processing), but it is still feasible to view each stage in the chain as performing a self-contained 
function. Moreover one end of the chain at least is anchored in the external observable world. While 
this may be an appropriate decomposition for vision it is less clear that higher cognitive functioning 
can be decomposed so neatly into stage-wise processing. Thus, ARL accounts of cognitive processes 
generally conceive of observable behaviour as the product of multiple interacting subsystems (such as 
working memory, attention, goal generation and maintenance, etc.), with the interactions between 
those subsystems not being amenable to linearisation. This poses a fundamental dilemma for CL 
accounts of the cognitive system that hypothesise such subsystems. Specifically, should a CL account 
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be directed towards the cognitive system as a whole or to the various hypothesised unobservable 
subsystems? Just as importantly, one cannot justifiably ask the “why” question of the functioning of 
subsystems without first addressing why the system as a whole might comprise those subsystems. For 
example, one cannot ask why working memory carries out such-and-such a function or should be 
optimised in such-and-such a way without first addressing why the cognitive system might comprise a 
working memory subsystem interacting with a range of other subsystems.3 
The above criticisms of purely CL explanations go beyond recent critiques of Bayesian accounts of 
cognition (e.g., Bowers & C. J. Davis, 2012; Jones & Love, 2011; Marcus & E. Davis, 2013). They 
reflect general concerns about explanations pitched solely at the Computational Level, regardless of 
whether those explanations are phrased in probabilistic, logical or set-theoretic terms.  
3. The Role of Neuroscience Evidence 
We have argued that CL accounts, in the absence of ARL accounts, are limited in their explanatory 
force. But could one not study the operation of the brain directly with neuroscience evidence alone? 
Notwithstanding Marr’s analysis, some might argue that this approach has been successful in 
understanding the functioning of peripheral systems (with low-level visual processing being perhaps 
the most celebrated success: Hubel & Wiesel, 1962). However, application of the reductionist 
approach to higher cognitive processes such as those involved in reasoning, decision-making, 
planning, problem-solving and language, is problematic for several reasons. 
Neuroscience offers a great variety of methods that might be deployed to investigate higher cognitive 
processes. These include methods that are entirely neurophysiological in nature (mapping neural 
pathways and connectivity), methods for tracking neural activity while performing a task (including 
numerous forms of functional neuroimaging with differing temporal and spatial resolution, as well as 
single cell recording in behaving primates, and, very occasionally, humans), and methods based on the 
analysis of the effects of brain lesions (including temporary lesions created via TMS and permanent 
lesions due to organic damage). Yet even with all of these methods at the neuroscientists’ disposal, an 
understanding of higher cognitive processes at the neural level remains elusive. Is it just a matter of 
time? 
Consider the case of propositional reasoning. The neurophysiological / implementation level appears 
to be the wrong level to begin an analysis of a complex ability such as this. It is unclear where one 
would start. Simply scanning subjects while they attempt reasoning tasks (with no cognitive-level 
theory of how such tasks are solved) is unlikely to yield informative results. In fact, there are many 
neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies of reasoning (see Shallice & Cooper, 2011, pp. 464-478 
for a review). The naïve observer might expect that these would have informed cognitive scientific 
understanding of the ability. Yet the studies present a confused picture, with a complex network of 
frontal and parietal cortical regions implicated across a range of reasoning tasks, and while clearly 
defined reasoning deficits arise in some neuropsychological patients, one cannot easily infer a theory 
of reasoning from the neural data. Indeed the neural data has low discriminative power with on going 
debates suggesting that the data are not even able to differentiate convincingly between existing 
cognitive level theories (cf. Coltheart, 2006, 2011). Perhaps just as critically, Goel (2007) argues that 
interpretation of the neural data from reasoning experiments requires a re-evaluation of psychological 
theories of reasoning, with the neuroscience evidence indicating that human reasoning involves 
separate systems for dealing with a) familiar and unfamiliar material, b) conflicting information and 
belief bias, and c) certain and uncertain information). The evidence from functional neuroimaging to 
                                                      
3 Note that decomposing the overall function effected by a system into a function of subsystems invokes 
algorithmic concepts because it expresses constraints on the order of processing and on intermediate results. 
Strictly speaking, therefore, this decomposition already requires going beyond the Computational Level. 
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support these dissociations is far from conclusive, and as Shallice and Cooper (2011) point out, dual-
system theories of reasoning were proposed long before neuroimaging evidence was available. Those 
theories draw on the same distinctions discussed by Goel (see, e.g., Evans, Barston & Pollard, 1983). 
So in this domain at least neuroscience evidence does not allow one to “explain” reasoning behaviour; 
nor does it trigger the complete re-evaluation of cognitive theory that Goel (2007) suggests. 
What then is the role of the neuroscience evidence? Consider first neuroimaging in its various guises. 
Coltheart (2006; see also Coltheart, 2011) argues forcefully that neuroimaging evidence has not 
informed psychological theory. His specific concern is in the use of neuroimaging evidence to 
discriminate between competing psychological theories, and he provides six case studies where 
neuroimaging has, contrary to the various researchers’ explicitly stated intentions, failed to have any 
discriminating force. Coltheart’s arguments against the utility of neuroimaging in cognitive theorising 
are not arguments in principle, and it is conceivable that future imaging studies will support the kind 
of theory discrimination that Coltheart seeks. In this respect the model-based methods discussed by 
Love (this volume) appear particularly promising. Note though that those methods are not reductionist 
– critically they require specification of a cognitive level theory that might be coupled to neural-level 
data. 
One reason why neuroimaging evidence is limited in the extent to which it can inform psychological 
theory is the “reverse inference” problem: can one infer the involvement of cognitive-level processes 
from activation at the neural level (or to be more precise, from differences in the BOLD response at 
the neural level)? Even if one had a clear understanding of the relation between the firing of neurons 
and the BOLD signal as measured by fMRI (and we do not: Maier et al., 2008), it remains possible 
that a single cognitive function might be implemented by a network of neural regions, or that a single 
region might implement multiple cognitive functions. For this reason cognitive neuropsychology – the 
investigation of cognitive deficits following neural damage or degeneration – provides an invaluable 
complementary source of neural-level evidence. Cognitive neuropsychology allows one to draw 
conclusions about the function of the intact cognitive system from patterns of behaviour following 
breakdown of that system. Shallice and Cooper (2011) argue that neuroimaging and neuropsychology 
make different inferential assumptions linking function to structure. While those assumptions may not 
be valid in any specific case, inferences that are supported by both neuroimaging and 
neuropsychological evidence are likely to be robust because in the event that the assumptions of both 
methods are violated, there is no reason why they should then yield a consistent localisation of the 
function under consideration. 
An alternative approach to solving the reverse inference problem has been developed by Poldrack and 
colleagues (e.g., Lenartowicz et al., 2010; Yarkoni et al., 2011). This approach automatically extracts 
activation foci (coordinate representations of brain regions showing activation or deactivation in one 
task relative to a control task) from reported studies and associates these with keywords in the 
corresponding write-up of the study. Machine learning techniques are then used to discover 
commonalities between studies associated with the same keyword and discriminate these from studies 
associated with other keywords. While the approach introduces many sources of noise into the process 
(e.g., by not differentiating between activation and deactivation of a region and by not carefully 
examining the reported contrasts and classifying them appropriately), this noise is countered by the 
large database of imaging studies that has developed over the last 20 years, and the approach has been 
successful at drawing distinctions between the neural activity associated with a range of keywords. 
Thus, Yarkoni et al. (2011) report that the neural regions extracted for (e.g.) the keywords “attention” 
and “executive” discriminate between studies of attention and studies of executive function with a 
mean classification accuracy of 64% (which is significantly above the chance level of 50% at the p = 
0.001 level on the dataset used). 
This automated meta-analytic approach attempts to understand brain function without recourse to 
either the ARL or the CL. While it draws upon cognitive constructs such as “attention” and 
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“executive”, it does so in an informal way without attempting to characterise those constructs in any 
way beyond their use in psychological discourse. While the approach might serve as a useful first step 
in relating cognitive function to neural structure, it fails to advance understanding of cognitive 
function in the Marr sense for several reasons. Firstly, it is necessarily coarse in its discriminations. 
While Yarkoni et al. (2011) consider 25 keywords, those keywords refer to very broad concepts 
(“pain”, “emotion”, “imagery”. etc.) and any attempt to focus in on more specific or more clearly 
defined subfunctions will be met with major difficulties in detecting a signal amidst the many sources 
of noise in the data. Furthermore, even with broad concepts the discrimination accuracy, while 
statistically significant, is low. More critically, however, even if discrimination accuracy was high the 
method would only allow one to answer “where” questions (i.e., where is function X computed?). It 
cannot answer true IL questions (i.e., how do neurons in the identified regions compute the function?), 
or directly answer the “what”, “why” or “how” questions that characterise Marr’s higher levels. 
Suppose though that neuroscience was to yield a complete understanding of the neural basis of 
behaviour, such that for a simple task (say choice reaction time) we understood how neural firing in 
low-level perceptual areas ultimately led to neural firing in peripheral motor neurons. Such an 
“explanation” would still be incomplete if it did not abstract away from the neural hardware of the 
individual. More than that, however, the explanation would need presumably to abstract away from 
neural hardware altogether if we are, for example, to be able to reimplement the relevant functioning 
in different hardware. In other words, the explanation would need to operate at a level above the IL. 
Thus the critical “multiple realisability” argument made by Marr (1972) against reductionist 
neuroscience – namely that there is no reason to believe that a cognitive system couldn’t be realised in 
any number of different computational substrates – still holds. The flip side of this argument is the 
claim (which we accept may be more an article of faith than an empirical fact) that cognitive level 
constructs, whether they be beliefs and goals (in reasoning and problem solving), phonemes or 
morphemes (in linguistic theory), or action schemas (in routine action selection) are causally 
efficacious and therefore cognitive theory, operating at the level of such constructs, provides a level of 
abstraction that is critical to understanding common function across individuals and across species. 
4. Beyond Single Level Explanations: The Role of Cognitive Architectures 
One way to address the limitations of purely CL explanations is to develop ARL models that 
instantiate (at least to a first approximation) relevant CL principles and that are therefore able to 
approximate solutions provided by CL analyses. For example, one might develop a Bayesian CL 
explanation into an ARL model by introducing a mechanism that instantiates Bayesian inference. The 
benefit of such an approach would come from the explicit mapping between ARL mechanisms and 
Bayes’ rule, which would allow such models to impose constraints on the assumptions of the latter and 
suggest explanations of suboptimal observed behaviour. 
This approach has recently been adopted by Bayesian theorists in the form of “rational process 
models” (Sanborn, Griffiths & Navarro, 2010; Shi, Griffiths, Feldman, & Sanborn, 2010; Griffiths, 
Vul & Sanborn, 2012). The proposed models use Monte Carlo algorithms (e.g., importance sampling, 
particle filters, Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods) which approximate Bayesian inference by 
sampling from a probability distribution. The predictions of rational process models can be degraded 
from the optimal Bayesian solution to suboptimal (i.e., human-like) performance by, for example, 
reducing the number of samples taken. 
While lauding the efforts of Bayesian theorists to acknowledge their critics and address the question of 
links to the ARL, the approach has several limitations. First, the direction of influence in this approach 
remains entirely top-down, with no constraints being placed by the rational process model upon, for 
example, the priors of the Bayesian model; the sole purpose of rational process models is to sample a 
probability distribution from the Bayesian model, with the ARL model being post hoc.  
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Second, Monte Carlo methods are a class of algorithms specified at an abstract level which omit 
details of how sampling is achieved. This degree of abstraction places the key claim that ARL 
approximations of CL solutions are achieved by sampling from a probability distribution alongside the 
claims that problem-solving is search over a problem space or that learning is gradient descent on an 
error surface; high level characterisations of processes that may be implemented by numerous 
different algorithms. What unites them is their agnosticism about cognitive architecture; they contain 
no claims about the structure of the mechanisms involved or the nature of the limits of those 
mechanisms. 
While such agnosticism might be justified if behavioural measures cannot distinguish between more 
detailed characterisations of the processes, specifying such detailed hypotheses of representations and 
mechanisms is the aim of ARL models and it is this level of detail that allows them to account for 
additional behavioural measures such as strategy differences and response times. An alternative, 
potentially more unifying approach to bridging the ARL and CL therefore would be to take existing 
ARL frameworks or models and to consider how they can be related to Bayesian inference (or some 
other CL principle). 
One move in this direction is the “computational rationality” approach (Howes, Lewis, & Vera, 2009; 
Lewis, Howes, & Singh, 2014), which applies Russell and Subramanian’s (1995) notion of bounded 
optimality for artificial intelligence agents to the analysis of human behaviour. The underlying 
assumption of this approach is that human behaviour is generated by cognitive processes that are 
adapted not only to the structure of the environment but also to the (bounded) cognitive architecture 
and it is this latter feature which determines suboptimal human performance compared to an optimal 
Bayesian CL solution. Computational rationality differs significantly therefore from the rational 
process models approach in requiring not only the specification of a task environment but also a 
cognitive architecture and a set of programs to execute behaviours to be specified at the ARL. 
A second approach has been followed by Bayesian modellers who have sought to identify memory 
mechanisms that implement the Monte Carlo algorithms of rational process models. This has resulted 
in recent demonstrations that the importance sampling algorithm can be implemented by exemplar-
based memory mechanisms (Shi & Griffiths, 2009; Shi, Griffiths, Feldman, & Sanborn, 2010; Abbott, 
Hamrick, & Griffiths, 2013). These mechanisms approximate sampling from the prior distribution by 
retrieving memories (hypotheses) according to their degree of similarity to the current context and 
then weighting them by the likelihood function to obtain an approximation to the posterior 
distribution. 
A similar approach to bridging CL and ARL theories also does so by memory retrieval mechanisms 
based on relevance to the current context (Anderson, 2007; Lebiere et al., 2013; Thomson & Lebiere, 
2013). Implemented within the ACT-R cognitive architecture, this method assumes that declarative 
knowledge chunks in long-term memory have a level of activation that determines their probability of 
retrieval. In this conception, chunk activation is proportional to log-likelihood and a chunk’s activation 
is updated (the likelihood function) from its initial base level (prior) to its final level (posterior) 
according to its similarity to the current context. This mechanism is essentially identical to the 
exemplar-based models of importance sampling mentioned above (although a formal equivalence has 
not been demonstrated) opening the possibility that many mechanisms exist that exhibit the same 
properties. 
Given this possibility, the question then arises as to how one should compare and evaluate these 
alternatives. One obvious criterion is the number and nature of the constraints each mechanism 
imposes on the CL theory. In contrast to the exemplar-based models which are relatively simple in 
their representational and algorithmic assumptions, the other two approaches are both embedded 
within the broader theoretical commitments of a cognitive architecture (ACT-R) which imposes strong 
constraints on declarative and procedural learning and the learning of activation and utility values. 
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These ARL constraints severely limit the number and nature of the hypotheses at the CL and therefore 
the kinds of inferences that can be made. In addition, the mechanisms determining these learning and 
control processes are consistent with both behavioural and neural data (Lebiere et al., 2013; and see 
below), leading to the possibility that through these connections to both the computational level above 
and the implementational level below, cognitive architectures like ACT-R can provide a bridge that 
unites Marr’s three levels. 
One can make many arguments for the utility of developing cognitive models within a cognitive 
architecture (see, for example, Newell, 1990, and Cassimatis et al., 2008), but adopting the concept of 
cognitive architecture is in fact highly consistent with Marr’s original approach to vision. His 
decomposition of visual processing into a series of stages effectively specifies a visual processing 
architecture. Importantly, Marr does not provide a CL account of vision as a whole. Rather he argues 
for the provision of CL (and ARL and IL) accounts of each component of his visual processing 
architecture. There is therefore a critical difference in the starting point of Marr and that of many 
Bayesian approaches to cognitive processing, such as those of Norris (2006) or Griffiths et al. (2008). 
Trying to provide a CL account of the organism as a whole fails to take account of the (assumed) 
functionally modular substrate that supports cognitive processing. Cognitive architectures decompose 
the cognitive system into interacting functional subcomponents, and following Marr it is these 
components that are most usefully characterised at the CL, ARL and IL4. At the same time a cognitive 
architecture by itself does not normally uniquely determine how a specific task might be accounted for 
at the ARL. The strength of the “computational rationality” approach of Howes, Lewis and colleagues 
discussed above is that it addresses this relationship. At the same time the approach of Lebiere and 
colleagues described above aims to provide task independent CL accounts (with links to the IL) of the 
functional subcomponent(s) responsible for retrieval from long term memory. 
Work involving cognitive architectures, in which functional subcomponents are associated with neural 
regions or structures, also promises to help bridge the neuroscience and psychological levels. For 
example, over the last decade Anderson and his colleagues have attempted to map the core modules of 
the ACT-R cognitive architecture onto brain regions via fMRI data relating to the BOLD response 
(e.g., Anderson, 2005; Anderson et al., 2003; Qin et al., 2003, 2004). This has led to the identification 
of the five core processing modules of ACT-R with associated brain regions. The mapping of elements 
between two levels in this manner has allowed models and data from each to influence the other. Thus, 
in fMRI studies of the development of children’s algebra skill, a computational model of eye 
movement sequences, memory retrievals, problem solving steps and responses was able to account for 
the relative changes in patterns of activation in different brain regions due to learning. The direction of 
influence is not just in the direction of ARL to IL. In Anderson’s work, imaging data have also 
influenced developments in the cognitive architecture. The original ACT-R architecture contained a 
single goal buffer containing both control knowledge and problem state knowledge. BOLD response 
patterns suggested however that changes in the former correlated with activity in the anterior cingulate 
while changes in the latter corresponded to activity in a parietal region. This led to a separation in the 
cognitive architecture between the goal buffer for control state knowledge and an ‘imaginal’ buffer for 
problem state knowledge (Anderson, 2005).5  
                                                      
4 In addition to the standard arguments for cognitive architectures, Simon (1962) argued that hierarchically 
organised systems (i.e., systems composed of subsystems) provide a kind of stability of subfunction that supports 
evolutionary processes. So the concept of a cognitive architecture is consistent with the kind of evolutionary 
analysis of the human cognitive system that many contemporary proponents of CL-first accounts espouse. 
5 ACT-R is used here as a well-worked example, but in principle the comments apply equally to any cognitive 
architecture that attempts to bridge higher levels with the IL. Thus, the SAL hybrid multi-level architecture of 
Jilk et al. (2008) provides a further example. 
10 
 
While the mapping between the IL and the ARL within ACT-R is arguably too coarse (e.g., at the time 
of writing there are regions of cortex, as well as subcortical structures, with no associated ACT-R 
module, and the ACT-R mapping assumes that all IL processes are organised bilaterally), the work 
illustrates the profitable interaction between the ARL and the IL. The architectural approach also 
addresses a key limitation of Poldrack’s approach to reverse inference as discussed in section 3. Recall 
that this approach aims to map structure to function by determining, across a very large database of 
functional neuroimaging studies, the brain regions or networks that allow one to discriminate between 
studies of cognitive-level constructs such as attention and executive function. A significant concern is 
that, as operationalised by Poldrack and colleagues, those cognitive-level constructs are described 
informally. However, this may be addressed by the development of process models within a cognitive 
architecture for the tasks in question, thus ensuring that one has robust hypotheses concerning how 
different architectural functions or components are implicated in different tasks.  
To summarise, then, while neuroscience evidence cannot be used in a purely bottom-up fashion to 
understand cognitive functioning, it may still provide a valuable complement to cognitive (i.e., 
algorithmic and representational) level theorising, providing supporting evidence for specific theories 
of the functional organisation of some faculty, particularly when neuroimaging and neuropsychology 
provide converging evidence for cognitive-level subfunctions, or when a theory of the organisation of 
the cognitive architecture can bridge between the ARL and the IL. 
5. Conclusion 
In the 30+ years since Marr proposed his tri-level hypothesis, significant theoretical advances have 
been made at each level of analysis. However, in our view the most critical advance has been the 
development of plausible cognitive architectures that decompose the cognitive system into interacting 
functional components. Given such a decomposition, one might begin to develop CL, ARL and IL 
accounts of the components. However, this would not be sufficient for neural-level data to inform 
cognitive theory. For this, it is necessary to develop ARL accounts of performance on the tasks used to 
generate the neural-level data. We suggest this is most likely to be productive when attempted within a 
putative cognitive architecture in which the functional components of the architecture have CL 
descriptions or explanations. Such an approach will ground the function of the architectural 
components while allowing  cognitive explanations to be linked to behavioural data, and neuroimaging 
and neuropsychological studies to inform our understanding of the neural instantiation of architectural 
components. 
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